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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS RECOGNIZED IN
LOUISIANA'S NEW CHILDREN'S CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 1991, the Louisiana legislature adopted a children's code.,
The code is the result of a compilation of the existing laws that affect
children in Louisiana.' However, a compilation of existing statutes would
be incomplete if the statutes did not accurately reflect settled jurispru-
dence, particularly supreme court decisions that call into question the
continued viability of existing statutes. Therefore, the Children's Code
Committee, the group responsible for drafting the code, revised the
statutory scheme to take into account areas of the law where the courts
had spoken but the existing statutes had not been amended to reflect
these opinions.
In recent years, both federal and state supreme court decisions have
recognized the right of the biological father of an illegitimate child to
oppose the adoption of his child, if the father has admitted his paternity
and assumed parental responsibility. Yet Louisiana's statutes on surrender
of parental rights and adoption had not been amended to reflect these
decisions. Accordingly, as part of the effort to insure that the Children's
Code reflected both current statutory law and current judicial decisions,
the Children's Code Committee incorporated the mandates of the courts
regarding the constitutional rights of putative fathers' and revised the
statutory scheme governing the voluntary surrender of parental rights. 4
Without these amendments, many adoptions in Louisiana would be
susceptible to constitutional attack.
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I. The Children's Code was passed as 1991 La. Acts No. 235 and was approved
by the Governor on July 2, 1991. The effect of the code, in addition to containing new
provisions, is to repeal articles 1-128 of the Code of Juvenile Procedure and numerous
statutes in Title 9 of the Revised Statutes. The sections regulating surrender and adoption
that have been repealed are 9:401-441.
2. Prior to the adoption of the Children's Code, 89 separate titles and codes regulated
the lives of Louisiana's children. This lack of organization led to ambiguity, conflicting
statutes, and a burdensome system of laws that was not easily accessible. The Children's
Code Committee, a group committed to improving the quality and efficiency of the legal
system that affects children, remedied these problems by compiling all of the existing
statutes into a single source in addition to classifying and clarifying them.
3. A putative father is defined as the alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate
child. Black's Law Dictionary 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
4. The articles on Surrender of Parental Rights are located in Title XI of the
Children's Code and became effective on January 1, 1992.
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The focus of this comment is the constitutionally recognized rights
of the putative father and Louisiana's recent legislative revision recog-
nizing these rights. To understand the necessity for the recent revision
of the surrender and adoption articles, section II chronicles the historical
development of the rights of putative fathers as recognized in major
United States Supreme Court decisions. Then, section III explains Louis-
iana law as it existed prior to the statutory revision. The significance
of the recent legislative enactments is apparent only when contrasted to
the law before the revision. In section IV, the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in In re Adoption of B.G.S. 5 is examined. The court held in
this opinion that the method of terminating an unwed father's rights
provided by the existing statute was unconstitutional. In section V, the
new surrender statutes that recognize the rights of the putative father
are analyzed and explained in an effort to assist those practicing in the
field of adoption. In spite of the comprehensiveness of this statutory
scheme, drafted to protect the constitutional rights of the natural father,
there are concerns left unresolved. Section VI of this comment addresses
the issues that arise when the mother refuses to identify the father and
thus denies him notice of any adoption proceeding,
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the past twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has
on four occasions examined the extent to which a natural father's
biological relationship with his illegitimate child receives constitutional
protection. In the first of these cases, Stanley v. Illinois,, the Court
held that a custodial putative father could not be deprived of the custody
of his children unless he was first found to be an unfit parent. Stanley
lived with and cared for his children intermittently throughout their lives,
and there was nothing in the record to indicate that he had been a
neglectful father. The Illinois statute, struck down by the Court, allowed
the state to remove an illegitimate child from his father's custody and
place him in a foster home upon the death of his mother, without any
proceeding to first determine whether the father was a competent parent.
Under this statute, the nature of the relationship between the father
and the child was irrelevant; upon the death of the mother, the child
automatically became a ward of the state. The Court held that the
putative father had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the
children he had "sired and raised," 7 and that the removal of the children
from his custody without first giving him an opportunity to present
evidence regarding his fitness as a parent violated his right to due process.
5. 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).
6. 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
7. Id. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 1212.
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The Court's subsequent decision in Quilloin v. Walcott' significantly
restricted the breadth of the holding in Stanley. In Stanley, the Court
explained that the state's interest in caring for the children was "de
minimis" if the father was in fact a fit parent. 9 When, however, the
countervailing interests are more substantial, as they were in Quilloin,
the degree of protection that a state must afford to the rights of an
unwed father may not be the same.' 0 Quilloin had never lived with or
had custody of his son, nor had he formally legitimated the child." He
had, however, informally acknowledged the child and established a re-
lationship With the child consisting of sporadic visits and support. In
this case the husband of the mother, with whom the eleven-year-old
child had lived for the past eight years of his life, sought to adopt the
child, and the child expressed his desire to be adopted by his stepfather.
The Court found these countervailing interests substantial enough to
uphold the constitutionality of the Georgia statute that authorized the
adoption of an illegitimate child over the objection of the biological
father who had not been found to be an unfit parent.
At the adoption proceeding the relevant question was not whether
the putative father was a fit parent; rather, the lower court inquired
whether the adoption was in the best interest of the child.' 2 The Supreme
Court found that Quilloin's procedural due process rights had been fully
satisfied by the opportunity to be heard on his claims concerning the
child's care and custody, and that the application of the "best interests
of the child" standard did not violate his substantive due process rights."
In Caban v. Mohammed, 4 the Court further clarified the nature of
the protection the state must afford the natural father of an illegitimate
child. The challenged New York statute allowed the mother of an
illegitimate child to veto the child's adoption simply by withholding her
consent. An unwed biological father, however, could not veto the adop-
tion by withholding his consent, and an adoption of his child could be
granted over his objection if the court determined that the adoption
would be in the best interest of the child. 5 Even though the statute in
question was similar to the one that had been upheld in Quilloin, the
Court held that such a discriminatory gender-based statute resulted in
8. 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978).
9. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58, 92 S. Ct. at 1216.
10. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248, 98 S. Ct. at 551.
II. The Georgia statute in question gave Quilloin the right to veto the adoption if
he had formally legitimated the child prior to the filing of the petition for adoption.
12. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S. Ct. at 554.
13. Id. at 254, 98 S. Ct. at 554.
14. 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
15. Id. at 386-87, 99 S. Ct. at 1765.
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a denial of equal protection to a father who had an established rela-
tionship with his child. 6
The facts of Caban, however, were more compelling than those in
Quilloin. In Caban, the parents were living together when the children
were born, and the father shared in the care and support of the children
for a number of years. When the children were two and four years
old, the parents separated and each subsequently married and sought
custody of the children. Later, the mother's husband sought to adopt
the children with the mother's consent. In upholding the father's equal
protection challenge, the Court emphasized that the New York statute
discriminated against a putative father who had manifested a parental
interest in his child and who had demonstrated a commitment to main-
taining a significant relationship with the child. 7 The difference in the
Court's holdings in Caban and Quilloin is explained by the difference
in the quality and the nature of the relationship that existed between
the father and his children.
The extent of the right of the putative father to block the adoption
of his child was most recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Lehr
v. Robertson." The adoption in this case was sought by a stepfather
who married the mother eight months after the child's birth. The adop-
tion proceedings began after the child was two years old, without Lehr's
knowledge and without notice to him. The Court determined that Lehr
had not demonstrated a custodial, personal, or financial commitment
to his child and therefore he had not developed a relationship with the
child that deserved any further procedural protection than that already
provided by the state. The state had established a putative father registry
through which a putative father could file to claim paternity of a
particular child. Under the New York statute, a putative father who
filed was entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding and gained standing
to challenge the adoption of his child. The state also required that notice
of an adoption proceeding be given to other classes of putative fathers,
none of which was applicable to Lehr.' 9
Rather than filing with the putative father registry, Lehr filed a
petition for visitation and to have his paternity recognized, but he filed
in a court in a different county than the one considering the adoption
petition. Lehr became aware of the adoption proceedings after filing his
paternity petition. However, because of his petition, the mother, step-
father and, apparently, the trial court were aware that he was trying
16. Id. at 391-92, 99 S. Ct. at 1768.
17. Id. at 392-93, 99 S. Ct. at 1769.
18. 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
19. Id. at 251-52 n.5, 103 S. Ct. at 2988 n.5. The inclusion of a putative father in




to intervene in the adoption proceeding. But because Lehr had not met
any of the statutory requirements, the judge deemed that he was not
entitled to notice of the proceeding, and the adoption was granted
without Lehr having an opportunity to voice his opposition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the adoption, emphasizing that the
statute authorized a simple means -by which a putative father could
protect his rights and that Lehr did not avail himself of this simple
procedure. It is significant, however, that the Court refused to base its
opinion solely on the basis of the father's lack of filing with the putative
father registry. Rather, it focused on the nature of the relationship that
existed between Lehr and his child. The Court emphasized that it was
not looking at the constitutionality of New York's procedures for ter-
minating a developed relationship as it was in Caban, because it de-
termined that Lehr, unlike Caban, had only a "potential" 20 rather than
a "developed" relationship with his child. The court classified his re-
lationship with his daughter as "potential" because he had never had
a role in providing custodial care for the child, he had visited her only
sporadically, and he had never contributed financially to her care. Fur-
ther, he had not sought to establish a legal tie with the child until after
she was two years old. The Court's classification of his relationship as
"potential" is significant. Under the Court's analysis, only a "devel-
oped" relationship is entitled to constitutional protection under the due
process clause."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White offered a very different
picture than the one painted by the majority.22 Immediately after the
baby was born, the mother concealed her whereabouts from the father,
successfully preventing him from developing a relationship with the child.
On the rare occasions when he located her, he visited with the child as
often as the mother would permit and offered financial support, which
was rejected. At one point the mother concealed the child from Lehr
for over a year, and only with the service of a private detective did he
finally learn the whereabouts of his child. The majority ignored the
issues raised in the dissenting opinion concerning the evasive maneuvers
taken by the mother which denied the father the opportunity to develop
the relationship that would warrant constitutional protection.
A possible explanation for the Court's willingness to overlook the
issues raised by the dissent is the deference that a majority of the Court
seems willing to give a de facto family that consists of the biological
mother, the child and the stepfather.2 3 The Court, in both this opinion
20. Id. at 261, 103 S. Ct. at 2993.
21. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 2993.
22. Id. at 268, 103 S. Ct. at 2997 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined
in the dissent by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
23. Id. at 262 n.19, 103 S. Ct. at 2994 n.19.
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and Quilloin, considered adoptions by stepfathers who had supported
the child and with whom the child had lived for most of his or her
life. The natural father in these cases was not seeking full custody;
rather, each father was seeking visitation rights and was attempting to
block the adoption by the stepfather. In neither case did the Court
expound on the weight given to the fact that it was a stepparent who
had petitioned for adoption and that the child would continue to live
in the same family situation that existed prior to the adoption. In each
of these cases, however, the Court justified its opinion because of the
legal recognition that the adoption gave to an already functioning family
unit. In Quilloin, the Court acknowledged that "the balance of equities
tips" in favor of the established family unit.2"
These four United States Supreme Court cases have a common
theme-a putative father's interest in having a relationship with his child
is manifestly a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment's
due process guarantee. However, the biological connection between the
father and the child, without more, does not merit constitutional pro-
tection. But when an unwed father is committed to his child, assumes
parental responsibility, and participates in the rearing of his child, his
interest in maintaining personal contact with the child acquires substantial
protection under the due process clause.3 In cases where the father has
never come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, or when
he has failed to grasp the opportunity to be a parent and accept some
responsibility for the child's future,2 the state may withhold from him
the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.27 But in cases, such
as Caban, where the father has admitted his paternity and established
a substantial relationship with the child, a state will not be allowed to
develop a statutory scheme that removes the child from the life of the
24. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 2994 n.19. Further evidence of the Court's willingness to deny
a putative father access to his child when the child is living in a functioning family unit
is seen in the Court's recent decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.
Ct. 2333 (1989). In that case, the child was the legal child of Gerald, the husband of
the mother, even though she was Michael's biological child. The mother and the child
lived with Michael intermittently during the first three years of the child's life, and
Michael. the putative father, held the child out as his child and had an established
relationship with her. He filed suit to be declared her father and to have visitation rights.
In spite of the relationship that existed between the putative father and the child, because
of the husband's legal status as the child's father, the Court denied that the putative
father had a fundamental liberty interest that deserved constitutional protection. The Court
was of the opinion that the type of relationship between Michael and his daughter had
not been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society,
but contrarily, American traditions have protected the marital family against the sort of
claim that Michael was asserting.
25. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
26. Id. at 262, 103 S. Ct. at 2993.
27. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1768 (1979).
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putative father, unless the father is first given notice of the proceeding
and an opportunity to defend his relationship. In Lehr, the Court clearly
distinguished between fathers with an inchoate relationship and those
with a fully developed relationship s.2
III. LOUISIANA STATUTES ON VOLUNTARY SURRENDER PRIOR TO THE
RECENT REVISION
Prior to the recent revision, the Louisiana legislature had, for over
twenty years, totally ignored the Court's opinions, and the existing
statutes were woefully inadequate to protect the constitutionally man-
dated rights of the putative father. The inadequacy became apparent in
the Louisiana Supreme Court case of In re the Adoption of B.G.S.,
when the court declared one key statute in the adoption scheme un-
constitutional. 9 Before B.G.S. and the changes in the law that resulted
from the B.G.S. decision can be appreciated, it is necessary to understand
the statutory scheme that existed at that time.
Historically, Louisiana had two different sets of statutes governing
surrender, depending on whether the parent surrendered the child to an
agency 0 or to a priiate individual." The legislature justified these dis-
tinctions on the theory that there were built-in safeguards against coercion
of the mother in agency surrenders.2 Theoretically, in agency adoptions
a caseworker assigned to confer with the parent counsels the parent and
insures that the surrendering parent is aware that the act of surrender,
once executed, is irrevocable. 3 Whether this was a valid distinction is
now a moot point because under the new law this distinction has only
limited significance. But, under the old statutory scheme, the two dif-
ferent sets of statutes resulted in two different sets of requirements
governing the rights of the putative father, although the father had no
role in selecting the mode of surrender used by the mother.
A. Surrender to an Agency
When an unwed mother voluntarily surrendered her child, her sur-
render alone terminated all parental rights of the father, unless he had
formally acknowledged or legitimated the child prior to her surrender
3 4
A mother could surrender her child to an agency immediately after
28. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 n.17, 103 S. Ct. at 2993 n.17.
29. It was La. R.S. 9:422.8 that was found unconstitutional.
30. La. R.S. 9:402 (1991).
31. La. R.S. 9:422.3-422.13 (1991).
32. F.D. v. Associated Catholic Charities of New Orleans, Inc., 480 So. 2d 380, 382
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
33. Golz v. Children's Bureau of New Orleans, Inc. 326 So. 2d 865 (La. 1976).
34. La. R.S. 9:404 (1991).
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birth, whereas surrenders to a private individual required that the mother
wait for five days before surrendering the child.3 The mother's swift
surrender to an agency effectively denied the putative father any op-
portunity to acknowledge the child and oppose the adoption. No other
code articles governing agency surrenders recognized the rights of a
putative father who wanted to gain custody of his child and raise the
child himself. Nor was any other procedural safeguard provided through
which the putative father could gain a hearing regarding his interest in
his child if he had not acknowledged or legitimated before the surrender.
In essence, a mother who surrendered a newborn baby to an agency
unilaterally denied the father all rights to the child.
B. Surrender to a Private Individual
Although the requirements for surrender to a private individual were
different than the requirements for surrender to an agency, the differ-
ences did not result in recognition of the rights of the putative father.
If the mother of an illegitimate child elected not to list the father's
name on the birth certificate, her surrender alone was all that was
needed to surrender the child for adoption.16 As .in surrenders to an
agency, the father could record an act of acknowledgment before the
child's mother executed the act of surrender." Because in private adop-
tions a birth mother could not execute an act of surrender until five
days after the birth of the baby,3 on its face the statute appeared to
provide a five day "window of opportunity" within which a father
could acknowledge the child and have his parental rights recognized.
Additionally, however, to secure his right to oppose the adoption, the
father had to have the act of acknowledgment recorded on the child's
birth certificate prior to the mother's act of surrender. 39
Even though these requirements were very narrowly drawn, it ap-
peared that the father had an opportunity, albeit a very limited one,
to achieve recognition of his parental rights. But what the law giveth,
the law may also taketh away. The articles that regulate the bureau of
vital statistics provide that a putative father may not place his name
on a child's birth certificate without the mother's consent.4 Common
sense dictates that few mothers will consent to having the father's name
on the birth certificate if her objective is to surrender the baby for
adoption without the father's approval. Thus, the statutes that regulated
35. La. R.S. 9:402 (1991). Cf. La. R.S. 9:422.7 (1991).
36. La. R.S. 9:422.4(B) (1991).
37. La. R.S. 9:422.14 (1991).
38. La. R.S. 9:422.7 (1991).
39. La. R.S. 9:422.14(B) (1991).
40. La. R.S. 40:34 (1991).
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private adoptions appeared to provide the putative father a means by
which he could oppose the adoption, but in reality the application of
these statutes gave no advantage to the father.
In the remote circumstance where the father was successful in timely
acknowledging his child -and having his name entered on the birth
certificate, he was not entitled to a hearing on his parental rights. He
gained only the right to oppose the adoption at a hearing on whether
the adoption was in the best interests of the child.
41
IV. THE LouISIANA SUPREME COURT SPEAK's IN In re Adoption of
B.G.S.
Clearly, the Louisiana statutes regulating surrender and adoption
did not incorporate the mandates of the United States Supreme Court
decisions described in section II. But this was the current law in Louisiana
in 1990 when the Louisiana Supreme Court heard the case of In re
Adoption of B.G.S.42 The unique facts in B.G.S. called attention to the
contradictory provisions in the Louisiana statutes that on one hand
seemed to grant the father the right to veto his child's adoption and
on the other hand enabled the mother to defeat this right by preventing
him from placing his name on his child's birth certificate. The failure
of Louisiana's laws to provide any protection to a putative father with
an established relationship, as required by the United States Supreme
Court, was obvious.
However, B.G.S. was a case that involved a newborn baby. The
United States Supreme Court has not spoken on whether, and if so,
how, a putative father of a newborn baby can establish a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his future relationship with his child. In
Caban, the Court specifically reserved this question.4 B.G.S. forced the
Louisiana Supreme Court to examine the very issue that had been left
unanswered by the earlier United States Supreme Court cases. The B.G.S.
court was confronted with a fully committed putative father of an infant
who was asserting his rights to veto the adoption and have custody of
his own child. It is the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in this case
that led to the revision of the adoption and surrender statutes.
41. La. R.S. 9:422.11(A) (1991).
42. 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).
43. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 n.II , 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1768 n.I (1979).
Since the question was not presented in Caban, the Court specifically expressed no view
on whether the difficulties of locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify
an adoption statute that distinguished between the mothers and fathers of newborns setting
forth more stringent requirements concerning the acknowledgment of paternity or a stricter
definition of abandonment.
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A. Facts
When sixteen-year-old R.S. discovered she was pregnant, the nine-
teen-year-old father, V.L., wanted to marry her. Her parents refused
to consent to the marriage and suggested that she surrender the baby
for adoption. R.S. acquiesced to the suggestion, but V.L. was opposed
and wanted to raise the child himself. In spite of his opposition, Mrs.
S. and R.S. informed the attending doctor that R.S. would surrender
the baby for adoption. The doctor notified an infertile couple who
contacted their attorney to petition for a private adoption. V.L. contacted
an attorney to oppose the adoption and learned he must have his name
placed on the baby's birth certificate in order to prevent the adoption.
Mr. S. filled out the birth certificate and refused to name V.L. as
the father. The day after the baby's birth, August 9, 1989, V.L. filed
an authentic act of acknowledgment with the clerks of court in both
Orleans and Jefferson Parishes" and requested that the clerks place his
name on the baby girl's (B.G.S.'s) birth 'Certificate.
Eight days after the birth of the baby, R.S. and her parents executed
an authentic act of surrender to the adoptive parents."5 On this same
day, in an effort to intervene in the surrender, V.L. contacted the office
of vital statistics and requested that the clerk place his name on the
birth certificate. The department of vital statistics gave him a form that
required R.S.'s authorization to name anyone as the father on the birth
certificate. V.L. continued to have communication with R.S. and re-
peatedly vowed to oppose the adoption and raise the child himself, and
he continued to request that she sign the form to name him as the
father on the birth certificate.4 Ultimately, on September 21, R.S. signed
the form acknowledging V.L. as the father, and he obtained a new
birth certificate designating him as the father of B.G.S. The following
day the adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption in the Jefferson
Parish Juvenile Court. V.L. timely moved to intervene and dismiss the
adoption on the grounds that the birth certificate named him as the
father and he had not consented to the adoption. 47
44. La. R.S. 9:422.14 (1991).
45. When a minor parent surrenders to an individual, his or her parents.must join
in the surrender.
46. In the meantime, on August 31, he filed a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/
or Request of Information Concerning Status of B.G.S." in District Court in Jefferson
Parish. A hearing was held on this petition on September 7, where he learned that B.G.S.
had been given to the anonymous adoptive parents. V.L. then amended his petition to
seek custody, visitation and/or the identity of the adoptive parents, and he filed a notice
of his intent to oppose the adoption.
.47. La. R.S. 9:422.4(A) (1991) provides that a father who is named on the birth
certificate can veto the adoption.
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The juvenile court, citing the provisions of the private adoption
statutes, held that the mother's act of surrender terminated the father's
right to veto the adoption because his name did not appear on the birth
certificate at the time she executed the act of surrender. The court
further held that V.L.'s only recourse was to attempt to show that the
adoption was not in the child's best interest during the adoption pro-
ceedings.
48
However, after the court of appeal ordered an evidentiary hearing,
the juvenile court declared Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:34 unconsti-
tutional. 49 Additionally, the court held that the lack of V.L.'s consent
invalidated the surrender and adoption proceedings.
On October 31, the adoptive parents appealed to the Louisiana.
Supreme Court from the juvenile court's judgment declaring the law
unconstitutional. The supreme court upheld the juvenile court's decision
that part of the statutory scheme for effecting surrenders for private
adoptions was unconstitutional. However, the court found the consti-
tutional deficiency in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.8, the statute
allowing the mother to unilaterally terminate the father's rights, rather
than in the birth certificate statute. The court held the method of
terminating parental rights provided by the statute was unconstitutional
because the statute established a mechanism allowing the state to ter-
minate the parental rights of a putative father without first providing
him with notice and an opportunity to be heard.,,
B. Louisiana Supreme Court Recognizes Constitutional Liberty
Interest in Relationship with a Newborn Child
If B.G.S. had been an older child with whom V.L. had lived and
supported, it is clear that the Louisiana statutory scheme applied to
V.L. would have been unconstitutional under the United States Supreme
48. La. R.S. 9:422.11(B) (1991).
49. This is the statute that requires the mother's consent before an unwed father can
place his name on his child's birth certificate.
50. On November 17, the juvenile court awarded temporary custody of the child to
her natural father, after determining that this would be in her best interest. In awarding
custody of the child to her natuial father, the juvenile court applied the guidelines
established by the Louisiana Supreme Court in In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988).
In that case, the court held that when the custody of a child is contested between the
natural parent and the adoptive parent, the biological relationship is to be given priority.
If the natural parent is a fit parent, the social policy of basing custody on the biological
relationship outweighs any advantages offered by the adoptive parents unless the child
has bonded with the adoptive parents to the extent that they are considered the child's
psychological parents. B.G.S. had not been in the custody of the adoptive parents long
enough to have developed a psychological bond with them; therefore, applying the J.M.P.
guidelines, the biological father was the parent who should have been awarded custody.
51. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 558 (La. 1990).
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Court decisions in Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, and Lehr. However, none
of the cases handed down by the Supreme Court have considered what
may be a more typical adoption situation: a birth mother refusing to
name the putative father on the birth certificate of a newborn infant
and then surrendering the baby to adoptive parents without the consent
of, or notice to, the putative father.
In Lehr, the Court clearly distinguished between an inchoate and
an established relationship, but did not address what actions, if any at
all, the father of a newborn might take to demonstrate a commitment
to fatherhood that would justify constitutional protection. The Court's
silence on the rights of a putative father of a newborn has permitted
state courts and legislatures to interpret Lehr in a variety of different
ways. Relying on the language in Lehr, a California court of appeals
recently stated that "Lehr does not stand ... for the proposition that
an unwed father who makes affirmative efforts to establish a relationship
with his child must be afforded an opportunity to veto an adoption.
Lehr mandates that some unwed fathers be afforded the opportunity to
receive notice and to participate in the adoption proceedings concerning
their children .... Nothing in Lehr mandates that rights of fathers ...
with 'potential' rather than 'substantial' relationships with their children
be equal to those of the child's mother." 2 The adoptive parents in
B.G.S. made this same argument: because V.L. did not have a developed
relationship with the child, he did not have a constitutionally protected
interest in his parenthood. 3
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this narrow reading of Lehr
and clearly recognized that an unwed father of a newborn infant may
establish a liberty interest in a future relationship with his child by
"coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child. '"54 Relying
on the four decisions reported in section II, the B.G.S. court found an
implied assumption that a putative father of a newborn child who is
fully committed to that child has a constitutionally protected interest in
the opportunity to develop an emotional bond with his child. If the
putative father grasps the opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he has done all that the United
States Supreme Court requires in order to have an interest worthy of
constitutional protection." Additionally, the court concluded article 1,
section 256 of the Louisiana Constitution independently recognizes that
52. In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 266 Cal. Rptr. 760, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist.
1990).
53. B.G.S., 556 So. 2d at 550.
54. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
55. B.G.S., 556 So. 2d at 550-51.
56. La. Const. art. 1, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
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a putative father may not be deprived of the right to establish a re-
lationship with his child without due process of law."
C. Due Process: Right to Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
Recognizing that V.L.'s relationship with his daughter deserved con..
stitutional protection, the private adoption statutory scheme clearly vi-
olated his due process rights to notice and denied him an opportunity
to present his case before termination of his parental rights. After
declaring Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.8 unconstitutional, the court
provided broad guidelines for the lower courts to follow until the leg-
islature acted in this area. Specifically, the court held that a putative
father deserves notice of the surrender of his child for adoption and
the opportunity for a hearing to establish whether he has demonstrated
parental commitment to the child.
1. Notice
The court held that the putative father is entitled to notice of any
proposed action to terminate his rights if his identity is known or readily
discoverable, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that his interest
has lapsed.5 8 The fact that the identities of some natural fathers may
be difficult or impossible to discover is not a valid reason to deprive
notice to a father who has come forward timely to make his identity
known and to assume his responsibilities and assert his rights. 59
2. Hearing
In every adoption there is a hearing before the juvenile court judge
to determine if the adoption is in the best interest of the child. The
B.G.S. court rejected the argument that the putative father was entitled
only to present his case and object to the adoption at this best interest
hearing. Addressing this issue, the court stated that "due process requires
that when a State seeks to terminate a protected interest, it must afford
notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
cise before the termination becomes effective."' ° The court clearly rec..
ognized that the father is not entitled to object to the deprivation of
except by due process of law." Since the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution in 1974,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has frequently relied on this section to recognize broader,
more expansive rights for the citizens of Louisiana than has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.
57. B.G.S., 556 So. 2d at 552.
58. Id. at 554.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 555 (emphasis in original).
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his rights at a best interest of the child hearing, in which he 'is only
given the opportunity to defeat the adoption by regaining parental rights
in competition with the adoptive parents. The court recognized that an
unwed father, deprived of the custody of his child, is at a severe
disadvantage to defeat the adoption by proving that the adoption is not
in the best interest of the child. "The rather sparse opportunity of an
unwed father whose children have been taken away to regain them by
defeating the adoption upon a showing that it is not in the best interests
of the children does not satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process. "61
The best interest of the child hearing is a very different proposition
from a hearing to show that the father has established a relationship
with the child and has not abandoned his constitutional right to parent
his own child. Therefore, the court held a best interest hearing should
occur only if the father has surrendered his rights or has had his parental
rights terminated. Whether the father has exercised his right to establish
and maintain a relationship with the child or, alternatively, whether he
has waived that right is to be determined at a hearing designed specifically
for this purpose.6 2 If the father does not respond or is not located
within a reasonable time, the court may terminate his parental rights
and continue with the adoption proceedings. "On the other hand, if
the father appears and demonstrates that he is fully committed to his
parental responsibilities and has grasped the opportunity to commence
a relationship with his child, the court must uphold his parental rights,
vacate the surrender and dismiss the adoption." 63
V. THE NEW ARTICLES ON SURRENDER FOLLOWING B.G.S.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in In re B.G.S. set forth broad
requirements to guide the lower courts in recognizing the rights of
putative fathers before the mother could surrender the child for adoption.
The new articles on surrender and adoption" incorporate all of the
general requirements from B.G.S.; however, to carry out these broad
requirements, many specific provisions were necessary. Following the
recommendations of the Children's Code Committee, the legislature
passed a comprehensive set of articles on surrender and adoption that
recognizes the rights of both the putative father and the mother.
This section will analyze the new articles and the constitutional and
policy reasons for the changes in the law. As each new article is discussed,
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 558-59.
64. The articles on surrender and adoption are located respectively in Titles Xl and
Xll of the Children's Code.
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the necessary steps that must be taken by attorneys will'be detailed in
an effort to provide guidance so that adoptions will not be invalidated
on technical grounds of non-compliance with the statutory scheme. Part
A of this section considers the notice to which the putative father is
entitled if the mother executes an act of surrender of his child. Spe-
cifically, the necessary content of the notice of surrender, the type of
service required for both resident and nonresident fathers, the appoint-
ment and duty of a curator to locate an identified father, and the
necessary effort to identify an unidentified father are all addressed in
part A.
Next in part B, the putative father's right to a hearing is explained.
Both the nature of the hearing and the proof that is necessary to establish
that he has a substantial relationship with his child are discussed. Part
C examines the rights of the mother if the putative father is successful
in vetoing the adoption. Finally, part D addresses the requirements
necessary if a putative father, rather than opposing the adoption, elects
to surrender his rights to his child. The requirements necessary for a
father's surrender to be valid are compared to the requirements necessary
for a surrender by the mother.
A. Notice
Even though In re B.G.S. arose in the context of a private adoption,
nothing in the opinion suggests that its holding is any less relevant when
the mother surrenders the child to an agency. The court required that
"when the father's identity is known or readily discoverable, he must
be given notice of any proposed action to terminate his rights .... ",6
A statutory scheme that treats putative fathers differently simply because
the surrendering mother chooses to surrender to an agency rather than
to a private individual would be subject to attack on equal protection
grounds and would lead to instability of adoptions. To avoid this prob-
lem, the legislature required that all putative fathers receive the same
due process protection of notice of the mother's surrender and an
opportunity to be heard, regardless of which mode of surrender the
mother elects.
As an additional safeguard, the law requires all acts of surrender
to be filed with the juvenile court within seventy-two hours after the
act is executed." This insures the court's involvement in the adoption
process from the beginning and insures that hearings are expedited and
that putative fathers receive procedural protection.67 The mother's act
65. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 554 (La. 1990).
66. La. Ch.C. art. 1131.
67. La. Ch.C. art. 1131 comment.
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of surrender serves as a trigger that the father must now be notified
of the surrender and informed of his rights.68
1. Notice of Filing of Surrender Form
To insure that the notice received by a putative father is sufficient
to inform him of his rights, the drafters supplied a form69 for notifying
the father of the pending proceedings. The form provides the father
with notice of the mother's surrender of the child for adoption and
informs him of what he must do procedurally to protect his rights to
oppose the adoption. 70 The required notice informs the putative father
that the mother has voluntarily filed an act of surrender alleging that
he is the father of the child and that he has fifteen days after receiving
notice to file a written objection to oppose the adoption. Upon objection,
the court will schedule a hearing within twenty days" to determine
whether he has established or forfeited his parental rights. The notice
must specify what affirmative efforts on his part would demonstrate to
the court that he had established a parental relationship with the child.
Finally, the notice informs the father that if he fails to file a written
notice of opposition, or if, after the hearing on the motion, the court
finds he has failed to establish his parental right to oppose the adoption,
the court will terminate any and all parental rights he may have and
the child will be subject to adoption.
2. Service Requirements
The Louisiana Supreme Court in In re B.G.S. did not specify the
type of notice required. However, the court, quoting from the United
States Supreme Court decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
68. La. Ch.C. arts. 1133 and 1134 require that notice of the mother's surrender is
to be promptly served on the nonsurrendering father.
69. La. Ch.C. art. 1132.
70. This is one of several efforts by the drafters to provide specific forms to insure
that the legislative mandate is followed. Use of the form provided in the code is not
mandatory; a similar form can be drafted. However, the comment to Article 1132 indicates
that using the form provided will help insure that "putative fathers receive accurate and
complete information concerning their potential parental rights . . . ." Other places where
the drafters have provided forms are Article 1125 (the affidavit of family history) and
Article 1122 (the voluntary act of surrender for adoption).
71. The comment to Children's Code art. 1132 states that the time requirements
imposed by this article are designed to comply with the requirements established in In re
J.M.P. In J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988). the Louisiana Supreme Court provided
that in all contested adoptions, hearings and appeals are to be heard and decided within
twenty days of the court's receipt of the notice or the lodging of the record on appeal.
The time limits were imposed so that a natural parent would not lose the right to custody
of the child because the adoptive parent had become the psychological parent to the child
during the delay between hearings.
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Trust Co., indicated that "a State must provide 'notice reasonably
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.""' 2 Unless the father actually receives the notice of the pend-
ing adoption, his fundamental right to "choose for himself whether to
appear or default, acquiesce or contest"' 3 is worthless. Therefore, every
identified putative father, unless he has previously executed a surrender
or waived notice of service,' 4 must receive notice of the mother's act
of surrender. If the father is a resident of Louisiana, he must be served
with notice either personally or with the notice of filing of surrender
left at his domicile." A nonresident father may be served by registered
mail, at the address that the mother has provided on the notice, with
return receipt required. 6 If the required notice does not reach the father,
further steps must be taken to locate him before he may be denied the
opportunity to be heard. The new articles, therefore, authorize the court
to appoint a curator to locate any father who is not reached by service
of process.
3. Appointment of Curator to Locate Identified Father
To insure that the father has every opportunity to exercise his rights,
a curator is appointed to receive notice on behalf of the father who is
identified but whose whereabouts are unknown." The appointment of
a curator provides a safety net for an identified father who has not
received service of process, either because the mother did not give an
address in her act of surrender or because attempts to serve him at the
address given were unsuccessful.
The responsibility of the curator is to make a diligent effort to
locate the putative father.'s Again, time limitations have been statutorily
imposed in order to insure that the process proceeds expeditiously. The
curator must begin the search for the father within seven days after the
appointment, exclusive of legal holidays. Thirty days after the appoint-
ment of the curator, the agency or the attorney for the adoptive parents
may file a motion with the court to terminate the father's parental
rights. Upon a finding that the father was not located and that a diligent
72. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 554 (La. 1990).
73. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct.
652, 658 (1950).
74. La. Ch.C. art. 1133 comment.
75. La. Ch.C. art. 1133.
76. La. Ch.C. art. 1134.
77. La. Ch.C. art. 1136 continues the requirement of La. R.S. 9:426 that a curator
ad hoc be appointed for any parent who cannot be located or is not domiciled within
the state.
78. La. Ch.C. art. 1136(B).
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effort was made to locate him, the court will terminate his parental
rights. The court requires the curator to investigate and submit proof
of unsuccessful investigations into any address listed in the mother's act
of surrender, and any address that the father provided in the putative
father registry or in a formal act of acknowledgment filed with the
Clerk of Court in the parish of the child's birth. 9
If the curator locates the father within thirty days of his appointment,
the curator serves the father with notice of the mother's act of surrender.
Additionally, the curator files an affidavit with the court detailing his
efforts to locate the father, discloses the location of the father, and
certifies that the father was given oral or written notice of the mother's
filing of surrender. The located father must file any objection within
fifteen days.80
The appointment of a curator serves a dual purpose in the adoption
setting. First, the likelihood of a father being located is far greater if
an independent attorney diligently pursues the father rather than allowing
the attorney for the adoptive parents or the agency to assume this
responsibility. The goal of the attorney who is representing the agency
or the adoptive parents is to secure the adoption, and locating the father
is at odds with this goal. A conscientious curator will follow up any
available information that would reasonably aid in locating the father.
These efforts should locate fathers who have been denied access or who
have no knowledge of the births but desire to raise their children. s'
Additionally, the curator's efforts help to insulate adoptions from later
attacks by unlocated putative fathers whose whereabouts could have
been determined with reasonable effort. If a curator makes a good faith
effort to locate the father but is unsuccessful, a later due process
challenge to the adoption should fail.
4. Diligent Effort to Identify an Unidentified Father
When the father of the child is "unknown", he receives minimal
due process protection. However, before his parental rights are termi-
nated, proof is required that a diligent effort was made to identify
79. La. Ch.C. art. 1136(D)(5) requires that the curator detail the efforts that he has
made to locate the father. The curator's efforts must include, but are not limited to,
publication seeking the father's whereabouts.
80. La. Ch.C. art. 1136(E).
81. Appointing a curator will increase the costs of adoptions. La. R.S. 9:426 says
that the curator is to be an attorney who receives a fee, and that the person who petitions
the court will bear the costs as costs of court. Therefore, the adoptive parents pay for
the curator's services. Apparently, if the father is located by the curator and he is successful




him. 2 When the attorney for the agency or the prospective adoptive
parents file the appropriate motion with the court, presentation of the
following four documents constitutes sufficient proof that the identity
of the father is unknown and that his identity has been sought with
diligent effort: the mother's declaration in the act of surrender that the
father is unknown; a copy of the child's birth certificate with no one
indicated as the father; a certificate from the putative father registry
certifying that no one has registered as the father; and a certificate from
the Clerk of Court in the parish where the child was born certifying
that no one has acknowledged the child. 3
If the identity of the father is unknown, this article is not a violation
of the father's due process rights according to the United States Supreme
Court in Mullane. "[Ilt has been recognized that, in the case of persons
missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably
futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates
no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights."8' The
state has provided two mechanisms through which the putative father
can take formal steps to establish his parental connection with the child.
The father may register with the putative father registry, and he may
formally acknowledge the child in the parish of the child's birth. His
failure to timely utilize one of these methods to assert his paternity will
result in the denial of any further right to a relationship with the child.
A close examination is necessary to determine whether the systems
provided by the state are adequate before the state will be allowed to
deny a father of his right to a future relationship with the child. The
Court in both Quilloin and Lehr assessed the adequacy of the methods
provided by the state for an unnamed father to come forward to assert
his paternity. In Quilloin, under Georgia law, a father's consent was
required for a child to be adopted if the father had formally legitimated
the child.8" Because Quilloin did not timely avail himself of this legal
procedure, 8 the adoption could proceed over his veto. Likewise, the
father in Lehr did not receive notice of his child's pending adoption
because he failed to register with the putative father registry, 87 similar
to the one established in Louisiana.
The Court ultimately upheld the adoptions of the children in both
Quilloin and Lehr because the fathers had not developed a substantial
82.. La. Ch.C. art. 1135(A).
83. La. Ch.C. art. 1135(B).
84. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 336 U.S. 306, 317, 70 S. Ct.
652, 658 (1950).
85. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248-49, 98 S. Ct. 549, 551-52 (1978).
86. Id. at 249-50, 98 S. Ct. at 552. Quilloin did not file to legitimate his son until
after the adoption petition had been filed.
87. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-51, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2988 (1983).
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relationship with their children that justified additional procedural pro-
tection. Because, in each case, the relationship between the father and
the child was an inchoate one, the Court found that the state had
provided adequate methods for the father to come forward and establish
his paternity. Louisiana has established both of the registration systems
found to be adequate in Quilloin and Lehr through which an unidentified
father can come forward to claim paternity. The inference can be made
that Louisiana's law, providing the father with the opportunity to register
in the putative father registry or to acknowledge the child with the
parish Clerk of Court, provides all the procedural due process protection
that the Court requires for a father who is unknown.
The new statutes provide with great specificity what type of notice
is required, what efforts must be taken to locate a father whose where-
abouts are unknown, and what evidence is sufficient to terminate the
father's rights if the father's identity is unknown. Precise detail was
included in the statutory scheme to insure that every putative father
with an interest in a relationship with his child would be afforded an
opportunity to present his case.
B. Right to a Hearing
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to. be heard.""8 Giving the father notice of the adoption proceedings is
of little value if he is not given an opportunity to oppose the adoption.
Under the new statutes, any father who chooses to oppose the adoption
of his child may do so by filing a motion with the appropriate court
within fifteen days after he receives the notice of surrender 9 or fifteen
days from the time he receies notice of the adoption if there was no
surrender.9
1. Nature of the Hearing
A debate has raged in many adoption cases over the nature of the
hearing given to the putative father. Many jurisdictions have taken the
approach that the unwed father gains only an opportunity to participate
in a hearing where the focus is to determine whose custody would
promote the "best interest of the child." 9 A court, when called upon
to decide who gets parental custody and rights to a child by applying
the best interest of the child standard, considers a multitude of factors.
88. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S. Ct. 779, 783 (1914).
89. La. Ch.C. art. 1137(A).
90. Id. An adoption proceeding where a mother consents to her husband's adoption
of the child would be one where there had been no surrender but the father would
nevertheless have the right to notice of the proceeding.
91. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254, 98 S. Ct. 549, 554 (1978).
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The value of the natural father-child relationship is only one factor in
the court's analysis.Y For this reason, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
B.G.S. rejected the best interest of the child standard as the applicable
test when a putative father with an established relationship or a com-
mitment to establishing a relationship comes forward to oppose the
adoption. 93 Rather, the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether
the father has established or forfeited his parental rights. If the court
determines that the father has established his parental rights, he gains
legal custody of the child and can veto the adoption.Y A father with
established parental rights is not forced to compete with the adoptive
parents to determine who can provide the most advantageous environ-
ment for the child. Procedurally, a father who proves that he has
established parental rights to the child walks out of the courtroom with
his child, as the child's legal custodian.95 If the father is not successful
in proving that he has established his parental rights, then his only
opportunity to defeat the adoption is at a best interest of the child
hearing where the judge weighs many factors before determining which
placement would serve the child's best interest.
2. Proof of Establishment of Parental Rights
At the father's hearing, the court will decide if the father has
established his parental rights and gained the right to custody of his
child. The B.G.S. court went beyond the standard set forth in Stanley
and required more than proof that the father is fit to be a parent. The
burden of proof on the father is to demonstrate to the court that he
is a fully committed parent who has taken affirmative steps to establish
and maintain a relationship with his child. 9' He may present evidence
of both formal and informal methods taken to establish a relationship. 97
Relevant evidence includes formal acknowledgment, legitimation or at-
tempted legitimation, a declaration of paternity filed in the putative
father registry, adjudication of paternity by a court, as well as informal
acknowledgment by providing substantial support and parental care to
the child.98
The father is not limited to proving he has an established relationship
with the above-mentioned evidence. The statute does not indicate that
92. Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and
After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 313, 346 (1984).
93. The holding of B.G.S. was codified in La. Ch.C. art. 138(A).
94. La. Ch.C. art. 1138(B).
95. The rights of the surrendering mother when the father has successfully defeated
the adoption are addressed infra in text accompanying notes 103-111.
96. La. Ch.C. art. 1137(B).
97. Id.
98. La. Ch.C. art. 1137 comment.
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any one of these requirements is necessary nor that any one alone will
be sufficient to prove that the father has established a relationship with
his child. The statute is broad enough for judicial discretion depending
on the particular facts of each case.
To illustrate, it should be recalled that the father in B.G.S. had
taken numerous formal actions to establish his relationship with his
child, and he was committed and competent to provide a home for the
child. He had not, however, provided any financial support during the
mother's pregnancy. The court determined that the mother had not
called on him to provide financial assistance, and he had done all he
could do to establish a relationship with the child," especially in light
of the efforts by the mother's family to deny him this opportunity. As
B.G.S. illustrates, the father of a newborn baby may have a more
difficult burden of proving by objective means that he is committed to
parental responsibility and that he has grasped the opportunity to accept
responsibility for his child's future, "but the due process guarantee is
not so narrow as to permit a state to deny him the chance to do so."'
When an evaluation of the parent-child relationship involves an older
child, Louisiana courts should require a showing of more than a formal
relationship, as the Court did in Caban and Quilloin. The only formal
relationship between Caban and his two children was the placing of his
name on their birth certificates. However, he had lived with the children
and the mother in a de facto family and had cared for and supported
the children for a number of years. *'0 The Court found he had established
a substantial relationship with his children that warranted protection.
In Quilloin, the father visited the child, provided sporadic support,
and informally acknowledged the child, yet the Court held he had not
established a relationship significant enough to allow him to veto the
adoption. It is notable, though, that in Quilloin the adoption was sought
by a stepfather with whom the child had lived for eight years, and the
only effect of the adoption was legal recognition of a family relationship
that already existed. The child indicated that he wanted to be adopted
by his stepfather, but that he also wanted to continue to see his father.'0 2
Thus Quiiloin is distinguishable from a case where the putative father
seeks to veto an adoption involving strangers. In such a case, it is
conceivable that a parent-child relationship similar to that between Quil-
loin and his son might convince a court that a relationship did exist
that was significant enough to allow the putative father to veto the
adoption.
99. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 551 (La. 1990).
100. Id.
101. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1763 (1979).
102. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251, 98 S. C. 549, 553 (1978).
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It is apparent from these cases that the court will have to weigh
each fact to determine whether a significant relationship has been de-
veloped between the father and the child. In addition to factors such
as the age of the child and the extent of the father's relationship with
the child, the court should also consider the mother's attempts to secrete
the child from the father or to deny the father access to the child, as
well as the persistence on the part of the father to protect his interests.
The court should not reward a mother by deciding that the father has
not established a relationship with the child if the mother made it
impossible for the father to maintain contact. Thus, although the ma..
jority in Lehr determined that Lehr had "never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection,
or care of the child,"'' 3 the dissent indicated that it was the mother's
actions which made it impossible for Lehr to establish a relationship
with his child. 1°4 Since the New York court denied Lehr an opportunity
to present his case, there is no proof of his assertions. If they are true,
however, the mother successfully deprived him of an opportunity to
establish a significant relationship with the child, and this lack of an
established relationship resulted in the denial of his right to veto the
adoption.
Protecting the due process rights of a putative father who is com-
mitted to his child is the purpose of Louisiana's newly adopted statutory
scheme. The vehicle through which the father may assert his rights is
the hearing where he may prove that he has established a relationship
with his child. The effectiveness of the plan will be insured only if the
father receives a hearing and at the hearing the judge considers all
relevant information in determining whether the father has seized the
opportunity to assert his interests and demonstrate his commitment to
his child. Counsel can protect the father's right to a hearing by timely
advising him to register with the putative father registry and/or to
acknowledge the child in the parish of its birth. The success of the
hearing will be determined by the effectiveness of counsel in presenting
all pertinent information and by the court's willingness to consider the
actions of the father as well as the efforts taken by others to hamper
the father's attempts to establish a relationship with the child.
C. The Rights of the Mother after Successful Opposition by the
Father
The effect of the father gaining legal custody of his child is to
dismiss the adoption proceedings. Therefore, the mother's surrender
103. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248. 267, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2996 (1983).
104. Id. at 268, 103 S. Ct. at 2997.
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cannot have the normal effects of transferring custody and terminating
parental rights pursuant to an adoption.1°1 Under the facts of B.G.S.,
the putative father and the surrendering mother were married'06 before
the final decision was rendered by the court. Therefore, the court simply
vacated the mother's surrender and stated that it had no effect on the
parental rights of either the mother or the father."' The court did not
discuss the rights a surrendering, mother may have in the more typical
situation where she does not continue a relationship with the father.
The legislature was left to determine what effect a successful op-
position by the father should have on the mother's surrender. The act
of surrender requires the mother to freely and voluntarily surrender
custody of the child for the purpose of placement and adoption.'0s The
effect of surrender is to grant the mother's irrevocable consent to the
subsequent adoption of the child,' °9 but when the mother "executes a
surrender, she does so in reliance upon the assumption that the adoption
of her child will be finalized. When, instead, the adoption is blocked
by an order recognizing the right of the father to withhold his consent,
then the mother's surrender is nullified for failure of cause."'' 0
When the mother executes her surrender, she legally terminates all
of her rights to the child. Every act of surrender must comply with the
formal requirement that the mother waives notice of any subsequent
adoption proceedings."' Therefore, she will not receive notice of the
putative father's opposition to the adoption nor of the hearing' to de-
termine if he has established his parental rights. Since the focus of the
father's hearing is to determine if he has established his parental rights,
evidence that the mother believes is relevant to the best interests of the
child will not be before the court. Therefore, if the court maintains the
father's opposition and allows him to veto the adoption, the mother's
surrender is invalid for failure of cause. The father now has legal custody,
but the legal rights the mother had at the time of surrender are reinstated,
or perhaps more appropriately, her potential rights are recognized. In
light of the change in circumstances, the surrendering mother must be
notified of the father's successful challenge to the adoption)" She may
then choose to reevaluate her decision to surrender and may petition
the juvenile court for a change of custody of the child or for visitation
105. La. Ch.C. art. 1139(A).
106. In re Adoption B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 548 (La. 1990). They were married after
obtaining a waiver of parental consent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:212.
107. B.G.S., 556 So. 2d at 556.
108. La. Ch.C. art. 1122(B)(5).
109. La. Ch.C. art. 1123.
110. La. Ch.C. art. 1139 comment.
Ill. La. Ch.C. art. 1122(B)(7).
112. La. Ch.C. art. 1139(B).
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privileges. At this hearing the mother may present evidence that would
bear on the best interest of the child.13
D. Requirements for a Father Who Elects to Surrender
Thus far the focus of this comment has been on the recently rec-
ognized rights of the putative father who wants to block the adoption
of his child, and on the necessary changes in the surrender articles to
protect his rights. Other changes were needed to protect the rights of
both parents when they elect to surrender the child for adoption by
providing that specific requirements be met for a surrender to be valid.
Several changes were designed primarily to insure that the mother is in
a position to make an informed and voluntary decision regarding the
surrender of her child. In an effort to insulate adoptions from future
equal protection challenges, the same additional protection afforded the
mother by the new law was extended to the father. However, the drafters
recognized that there are legitimate reasons for treating mothers and
fathers differently in some situations, so every requirement does not
apply uniformly.
The next three divisions of this comment involve a discussion of
the new requirements that parents wait five days after the birth of a
child to execute a surrender and that parents receive counseling before
executing a surrender, as well as the exceptions provided for fathers to
both of these requirements. Additionally, a new article that allows a
father to relinquish all claims to a child after the child's birth is discussed.
1. Five Day Wait Before Executing the Surrender
One of the changes from the prior law on surrenders concerns the
time at which a parent may surrender a child. Under the old statutes,
a parent who surrendered the child to an individual had to wait until
five days after the birth of the child to execute the surrender." 4 However,
if the parent surrendered the child to an agency, the child could be
surrendered immediately after birth. '" Under the new statutes, the mother
cannot surrender the child under any circumstances until five days after
the birth of the child." 6 The father, however, may execute the act of
surrender at any time before or after the birth, but the surrender can
be revoked until five days after the birth of the child. ' The purpose
for the five day requirement is to provide the mother with ample time
113. Children's Code Project Memo 1990-6, Surrender and Adoption Revisited at 25
(1990).
114. La. R.S. 9:422.7(A) (1991).
115. La. R.S. 9:402 (1991).
116. La. Ch.C. art. 1130(A).
117. La. Ch.C. arts. 1123(B). 1130(B).
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to recover from the physical and psychological impact of giving birth
and to insure that she has had sufficient time to reflect on the nature
of her actions. " ' Allowing the father to surrender anytime before or
after the birth of the child assumes that the physiological debilitation
of pregnancy and delivery has not affected his vulnerability. ' 9 However,
the drafters recognized that a father could also feel differently about
his parenthood after the child's birth than he felt before the birth,
leading him to change his mind about surrendering the child.,2 0 Therefore,
to insure that surrendering mothers and fathers are treated equally, a
father may revoke a surrender given before the birth until five days
after the birth of the child.' 2'
Allowing fathers to execute the act of surrender before the birth of
the child expedites the adoption process by providing for an early
determination of the father's intention toward the baby. If the father
executes a surrender before the birth of the baby, the birth mother, the
agency or attorney, and the adoptive parents are all in a better position
to proceed with plans for the baby's future knowing that the father
has surrendered his parental rights. An adoption that is granted after
receiving a valid surrender from the father is shielded from a future
attack by the father claiming his rights weren't recognized. Therefore,
allowing a father five days after the birth of the child to revoke his
surrender seems to be a small price to pay for the security the written
act of surrender brings to adoptions.
2. Counseling
Another of the new requirements governing surrender requires that
prior to the execution of a surrender, the surrendering parent must
participate in two counseling sessions with a mental health professional,
who must attest that the surrendering parent appeared to understand
the nature of his or her act.' This article has a twofold purpose. First,
it is intended to continue the requirement of Louisiana law that a
surrender for adoption be executed voluntarily with full knowledge of
its consequences. Additionally, it protects adoptions from later attacks
by the birth mother who asserts that the physical and emotional strain
of birth caused her to be susceptible to the overreaching of agencies or
118. La. Ch.C. art. 1130 comment.
119. Id.
120. Children's Code Committee Summary of Committee Action on Surrenders and
Adoptions at 4 (Nov. 16, 1990).
121. La. Ch.C. arts. 1123(B), 1130(B).
122. La. Ch.C. art. 1120(A) & (B).
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attorneys.12  The surrendering father may waive the counseling s 4 and
execute a valid act of surrender without it.
Anytime a statute makes distinctions based on gender, the possibility
of an equal protection challenge exists, unless the state can demonstrate
a legitimate interest that justifies the distinction. There are two possible
reasons for allowing the father, but not the mother, to waive the
counseling requirement. The most obvious is that the father is not
subjected to the same physical and emotional strain that frequently
accompanies childbirth and he will, therefore, not be as vulnerable to
outside pressures to execute the surrender. Another reason for allowing
the putative father to waive the counseling is that his act of surrender
is not necessary for an adoption. If the father is given notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and he does not make a timely opposition,
the adoption can proceed without his surrender. Since the putative
father's act of surrender is not absolutely required, he is not subjected
to the same pressures that may be exerted against the mother.'2 ' Ar..
guably, the gender distinction drawn between mothers and fathers in
this statute is based on rational reasons that further a legitimate state
objective.
The underlying public policy that is promoted by this distinction is
the stability that valid surrenders provide to adoptions. Even though
many unwed fathers are interested in raising their own children, many
others do not share this interest or are not emotionally or financially
prepared to accept the burden. If the father has no interest in establishing
a relationship with his child, it is better for all parties involved to
recognize his rights and to solicit his surrender. An adoption that pro-
ceeds without a signed surrender by the father is less secure from a
future attack by the father asserting violation of his due process rights.
But if the uninterested father must submit to counseling sessions before
he can execute an act of surrender, he might forego signing. This
circumstance could result in leaving all other interested parties uncertain
as to his possible claim to the child and may force the adoptive parents
or the agency to serve him with notice of the surrender and possibly
undergo the expense of appointing a curator to locate him after the
birth of the child. Thus, it is evident that the state has a legitimate
interest in providing stability to adoptions by protecting them from
future challenges by securing a signed surrender from an uninterested
father. This reason alone may be sufficient to insulate this article from
an equal protection challenge.
123. La. Ch.C. art 1120 comment.
124. La. Ch.C. art 1120(C).
125. Even though this comment is concerned with the rights of the putative father,
it should be noted that this argument is ineffective when applied to a married father
whose consent is required for the surrender.
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However, if the purpose of the counseling requirement is to insure
that the parent is making an informed voluntary surrender, allowing
the father to waive the requirement is justified only if some other
procedure insures that the father's surrender is both voluntary and
informed. If the state does not provide some other mechanism to protect
the surrendering father's interest, this article could be vulnerable to an
equal protection challenge.
The new articles include other safeguards to insure that a parent's
surrender to an individual is made voluntarily. An independent attorney
must represent the parent when the parent surrenders a child to an
individual. 126 Additionally, a surrendering parent who is a minor must
be joined in the surrender by his or her parents.' Both of these
requirements provide assurance that the surrendering parent has the
benefit of guidance to make an informed choice.
The same precautionary measures are not required when the sur-
render is made to an agency. Thus, a minor parent can surrender a
child to an agency without the consent of his or her parents, 8 and
surrender to an agency does not require the parent to have independent
counsel.' 9 Retaining these distinctions between agency surrenders and
surrenders to an individual is justified only because of the new require-
ment that a mental health counselor assist the surrendering parent in
making an informed decision. Analysis of the policy of distinguishing
between surrenders to an individual and surrenders to an agency is
beyond the scope of this comment. However, these differences, when
coupled with the father's ability to waive counseling, result in no safe-
guards to insure that a father makes an informed decision when the
surrender is to an agency. The father will not have the benefit of an
independent attorney, a mental health counselor, or, if he is a minor,
his parents, to assist him before he signs away his rights to his child.
The statute that allows a father, but not a mother, to waive counseling,
could be subject to an equal protection attack when coupled with the
other differences that exist in a surrender to an agency. 30
3. Relinquishment of Claims
The rights of the putative father to veto an adoption and gain
custody of his child were the impetus of the revision of the surrender
126. La. Ch.C. art. 1121.
127. La. Ch.C. art. 1113(A).
128. La. Ch.C. art. 1113(E).
129. La. Ch.C. art. 1 121. The requirements of this article are only applicable to private
surrenders.
130. Considering the strong public policy in favor of encouraging uninterested fathers
to execute acts of surrender, perhaps allowing the father to waive the counseling would
be acceptable if the safeguard of having an independent attorney to represent the father
was imposed on agency surrenders.
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and adoption articles. However, the drafters recognized that many pu-
tative fathers have no interest in a future relationship with their children.
Frequently, these fathers want to assume no responsibility, and because
they are fearful of the possibility of future support obligations, they
are reluctant to admit paternity. The fear is that the surrender is seen
as an admission of paternity, and if the mother changes her mind and
does not surrender the child, the putative father will be responsible for
paying support. This concern by putative fathers, and their accompanying
reluctance to sign surrenders, hinders all other parties from proceeding
with the adoption. As has been discussed previously, a surrender signed
by the putative father provides for a more secure adoption by insulating
it from later attacks by the father asserting that his rights have been
violated. Therefore, the drafters developed a statutory solution to the
conflict arising from these competing interests. The father is allowed to
consent to the adoption of his child by executing a relinquishment of
any real or potential claims that he may have to the child.' 3' The act
includes a waiver of service for any subsequent adoption proceedings,
as well as a statement that the act will not be used as evidence of a
confession, admission, or acknowledgment of paternity in any other
proceeding. 
32
Even though Louisiana Children's Code article 1196 allows the re-
linquishment of claims to be executed by any alleged or putative father,
it was designed primarily for use when the identity of the father is
uncertain or when a putative father has no interest in the child and is
not willing to admit paternity.'33 Although the relinquishment of claims
serves a useful purpose in the adoption setting when paternity is disputed,
it must be recognized that its availability presents the potential for
misuse. The alternative of using the relinquishment of claims instead of
the authentic act of surrender could result in denying putative fathers
the protection this legislation was designed to provide. Since the purpose
of the relinquishment of claims is to allow for more secure adoptions
by obtaining the consent of the uninterested father, it was written with
fewer requirements. The relinquishment of claims must be executed by
authentic act, but none of the other procedural safeguards necessary
for an act of surrender are required; The potential for abuse arises from
these differences. An attorney or agency could request that a putative
father, even a father who admits his paternity, sign a relinquishment
of claims rather than an act of surrender and deny the father the
safeguards of counseling and independent legal advice that are required
when a father executes an authentic act of surrender.
131. La. Ch.C. art. 1196(A).
132. La. Ch.C..art. 1196(B).




To insure that attorneys or agencies do not circumvent the rights
of the putative father by using the relinquishment of claims rather than
the act of surrender, the relinquishment should be subject to the identical
requirements of an act of surrender. Thus, to protect the rights of the
putative father, for a relinquishment to be valid, the father should be
subject to the counseling requirement; in a surrender to an individual,
the father should have the benefit of independent counsel, and a minor
father should need parental consent; the relinquishment should be rev-
ocable until five days after the birth of the child; and a family medical
history should be included for the benefit of the child being relinquished.
Until the legislature reconsiders this article, attorneys and agencies
are encouraged to use the relinquishment of claims sparingly and only
when an alleged father does not admit paternity. If this alternative is
applied to a putative father who does not contest paternity and the
father is not provided with the procedural protection provided by the
new articles on surrender, the father could later protest the adoption,
claiming that his relinquishment was not given with full understanding
of his rights.
VI. AREAS OF CONCERN UNANSWERED BY THE NEW LEOISLATION
The Louisiana legislature took a giant step forward with the approval
of the new Children's Code. The new articles on surrender and adoption
replace a scheme that probably had been unconstitutional since the United
States Supreme Court decision in Stanley with a scheme that provides
both procedural and substantive due process protection to the natural
father. At the same time this new scheme fosters the public policy of
providing greater stability and certainty to adoptions, thus serving the
best interests of the children adopted. If each requirement called for by
the statutes is meticulously followed, there should be few challenges
from surrendering parents and adoptions will be secure. However, any
deviation from these requirements will open the door for challenges to
adoptions by natural parents whose due process rights were circumvented
by other parties to the adoption. The responsibility for insuring that
the statutes are closely complied with falls squarely on the attorneys
and agencies who are involved in the adoption process. There needs to
be a commitment from these participants to follow both the letter and
the spirit of the law.
One area that seems to be especially susceptible to abuse by both
surrendering mothers and those concerned with placing the child for
adoption is Louisiana Children's Code article 1135. This article allows
an unwed mother who claims she does not know the identity of the
father to declare in the act of surrender that the father is unknown.
Because he is unknown, the effort required to locate him is less de-
manding and thus less likely to reach him than the effort required if
a name is given in the surrender.
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As explained in section IV, all that is required to terminate the
parental rights of an unknown father is the declaration that he is
unknown in the mother's surrender, a copy of the birth certificate
without the father's name, and certificates from the putative father
registry and from the Clerk of Court in the parish where the child was
born certifying that no one has filed in regard to this child. t ' Two of
these requirements, the declaration that he is unknown and the birth
certificate, are completely within the mother's control. The location of
the birth of the child is also within the mother's control. The mother
can elect to have the baby in any parish in the state or in any state
in the country, potentially making it extremely difficult and expensive
for a putative father to obtain the procedural advantage the statute was
designed to give him through registration.
If a father's identity is honestly not known, this statute serves a
valid purpose by giving a man who claims he is the father of the child
an opportunity to come forward to assert his rights. But absent artificial
insemination from an unknown donor, rape, or cases where a mother
has had multiple sexual partners, the mother will know the identity of
the father. It is highly prejudicial to the interests of the putative father
for a surrendering mother to list him as unknown when she in fact
knows his identity. The Louisiana Supreme Court in B.G.S. said, "[I]f
a mother wishes to surrender her child for adoption, it is in her best
interest to omit the father's name from the birth certificate so that he
will be unable to block the adoption of the child."' 13 Of course, the
court made this statement in the context of the prior statutory scheme.
However, a similar statement could be made about the new surrender
statutes. If a mother wishes to surrender her child for adoption, it is
in her best interest to withhold the father's name from her surrender.
Allowing a mother to avoid naming the father simply by declaring in
her act of surrender that he is unknown infringes on the rights of all
other parties involved.
First, the mother may be successful and the father will be denied
an opportunity to come forward in time to assert his rights. Even though
the statute provides methods through which the father can make his
identity known, the mother can circumvent his rights by wilfully with-
holding his name. The following hypothetical case serves to illustrate.
A woman living outside Louisiana becomes pregnant. She informs the
putative father, who is delighted. He assists the mother in paying for
the medical expenses during the early months of the pregnancy and
begins to plan for the future with a baby in his life. Later, the mother
decides she no longer wants anything to do with the father, and she
134. La. Ch.C. art. 1135(B).
135. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 556 (La. 1990).
19921 1039
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
does not want the father to have access to the child. She wants to
surrender the baby for adoption. So she comes to Louisiana, concealing
her whereabouts from the father. She contacts an attorney who represents
a couple who have been waiting to adopt a newborn baby. Five days
after the baby's birth the mother executes an act of surrender declaring
that the identity of the father is unknown. The attorney for the pro-
spective adoptive parents meticulously follows every statutory provision,
and the final adoption decree is granted in due course.
How secure is this adoption? It would be ludicrous to say the father
had forfeited his rights because he did not file an act of acknowledgment
in the parish where the child was born or register with the putative
father registry. He did not know where the child was born, and to
expect him to file in the putative father registry in every state that has
one imposes an unreasonably heavy burden. Further, the state established
this registration system to assist a putative father in making his identity
known in order to protect his rights, not to be used as a device to
deny the father due process if he did not avail himself of it in cases
where the mother actually knew. his identity.' 36 A strong argument could
be made that the mother's act of withholding the father's name resulted
in denying him due process because he did not receive notice of her
act of surrender nor did he have an opportunity to oppose the adoption.
Fraud or duress are the only actions available to annul a final decree
of adoption,' 7 and must be brought within six months of the discovery
of the fraud or duress.' The mother's actions in our hypothetical could
certainly be characterized as fraud.3 9 Other courts have addressed this
issue and have held the mother's action fraudulent if she stated on the
birth certificate and on the act of surrender that the identity of the
father is unknown in an effort to prevent the father from receiving
notice of the pending adoption and asserting his right to veto the
adoption. '0 Similarly, a mother's naming someone other than the father
136. Id. at 557-58.
137. La. Ch.C. art. 1262.
138. La. Ch.C. art. 1263.
139. La. Civ. Code art. 1953 defines fraud as a "misrepresentation or a suppression
of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party
or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other."
140. In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921,
101 S. Ct. 1370 (1981). In an effort to deny the father any access or rights to the child
in this case, the mother used an assumed name when she signed the birth certificate and
the act of surrender. On both documents she stated that the identity of the father was
unknown. A final adoption was granted, but when the father located the baby and filed
suit for his custody, the adoption was rendered invalid because the mother had fraudulently
denied the father the opportunity to receive notice of the proceeding. Therefore, the
adoption was executed without valid termination of the father's rights, and the father
was given custody of the child.
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on the birth certificate and act of surrender has been considered fraud
when the mother acted specifically to prevent the father from being able
to assert his rights to the child.
14'
When the mother refuses to name the father her actions impact on
all other parties to the adoption. Not only has she deprived the father
of his due process rights, she may also have subjected the adoptive
parents to a lengthy court battle with the putative father if he is later
successful in locating the child. In addition, the adoptive parents may
ultimately suffer the emotional trauma of having the child removed from
their custody if the father's action is successful.
Justice White has said that "there is no bar to requiring the mother
of an illegitimate child to divulge the name of the father when the
proceedings at issue involve the permanent termination of the father's
rights."' 42 But Justice White did not suggest what steps could be taken
to require the mother to divulge the name of the father. Furthermore,
a strong argument must be made on behalf of the mother that the state
cannot violate her right to privacy by compelling her to reveal intimate
details about her life such as the name or names of her sexual partners.
Support for the mother's right to privacy can be found from both courts
and commentators. '43 There is no indication that the statute was written
with the intention of compelling the mother to reveal the name of the
father, but informing the mother of the consequences of her actions is
the responsibility of attorneys and agencies. If the father later learns
of his parenthood and pursues an action in fraud, the adoption could
be in jeopardy, and it is the adoptive parents and the child who will
suffer emotionally and financially. An attorney who is aware that the
mother knows but does not want to reveal the identity of the father is
141. In re the Adoption of Baby Girl S., 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Surr. Ct. 1988). The
mother in this case was in the process of being divorced when she became pregnant with
the putative father's child. Because she did not want the putative father to have access
to the baby, she used her maiden name on her act of surrender and identified the father
as the man who had been her husband at the time she became pregnant. She even
submitted extrajudicial consent to the adoption from her estranged husband. She was
aware that the putative father wanted custody of the baby and had filed a petition to
establish his paternity before the birth of the baby. The adoption was granted to a couple
who were both practicing attorneys who also knew the identity of the putative father and
knew that he had filed to have his paternity established. Because the mother and the
adoptive parents had all acted to prevent the putative father from receiving notice of the
adoption, their actions were deemed fraudulent and the adoption was dismissed.
142. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 273 n.5, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2999 n.5 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting opinion).
143. Jerome A. Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental
Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 Fain. L.Q. 527, 536-41 (1975). In re the
Adoption of Jessica XX, 430 N.E.2d 896, 900 (N.Y. 1981) and the dissenting opinion
by Chief Judge Cooke at 904. When heard by the Supreme Court, this case became Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
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faced with an ethical dilemma between representing his client's best
interest in maintaining her privacy and insuring that she does not per-
petrate a fraud on the court and the father.
Another unfortunate result of the surrendering mother's failure to
name the biological father is to deprive the child of a statutorily granted
right. In an effort to provide adoptive parents and children with knowl-
edge of the child's genetic history, an extensive medical genetic history
of the biological parents and their immediate families'" is to accompany
all acts of surrender. In addition, the surrendering parent is allowed to
indicate his or her wishes concerning the release of nonidentifying or
identifying information in the event of a medical necessity for which
the information is needed to treat the child."' A child's mother who
withholds the name of the biological father may, at the same time, be
depriving the child of important medical information and of a potential
source of assistance in a medical emergency that may not arise for
years. 1" Arguably, the greatest wrong resulting from the mother's actions
is depriving her child of the liberty interest of having an opportunity
to associate with a potentially committed biological parent. Even though
society applauds adoptions of children who otherwise would not have
a home, one needs only to read the popular press to recognize that in
spite of happy adoptive homes, many adopted children have a strong
need to find their biological parents."17 There is no denying that the
biological connection is extremely significant, and every child should
have the opportunity to be raised by a biological parent when there is
one who is committed to assuming this responsibility. By refusing to
name the father in her act of surrender, the mother is denying her child
this opportunity.
VII. SUMAY
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a biological
father of an illegitimate child has a liberty interest in his relationship
with his child that requires constitutional protection if the relationship
is a developed one.
Prior to the recent statutory revisions, the Louisiana law governing
the surrender of children for adoption allowed a mother to surrender
the child without the putative father's consent. The only way a father
could gain standing to oppose the adoption was to have his name placed
on the birth certificate, and the mother was able to circumvent the
144. La. Ch.C. art. 1124.
145. Id.
146. La. Ch.C. art. 1189.
147. Bernard Gavzer, Who Am I?, Parade Mag., Oct. 27, 1985, at 26. Elizabeth
Taylor, Are You My Mother?, Time, Oct. 9, 1989, at 90.
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father's rights by refusing to allow him to have his name entered on
the birth certificate.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in In re Adoption of B.G.S. held
that the Louisiana statute that allowed an unwed mother to surrender
her child for adoption without first giving the putative father notice
and an opportunity to be heard was unconstitutional. Because of this
decision, and to comply with recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions, the Louisiana legislature recently adopted a statutory scheme
recognizing the rights of a committed putative father to veto the adoption
of his child. The father is entitled to receive notice of the mother's act
of surrender. The notice informs the father of the steps he must take
to assert his rights to gain custody of the child.
The hearing that results when the father comes forward to oppose
the adoption is not a hearing where he is placed in competition with
the prospective parents to determine what placement would be in the
best interest of the child. Rather, he is allowed to prove that he has
established a substantial relationship with his child. The father of a
newborn child is not excluded from joining this class of fathers. He
can establish the requisite relationship with his child by asserting his
paternity and taking steps that indicate to the court that he is a com-
mitted parent who is ready to assume responsibility for the child. When
a father is successful in establishing that he has a significant relationship
with the child, he gains the power to veto the adoption and gains
custody of the child.
To insure that the statutes that govern surrenders of children do
not discriminate on the basis of gender, the requirements for the putative
father's surrender are similar to the requirements governing the mother's
act of surrender. The mother cannot execute a surrender until five days
after the birth of her baby. The father can surrender the child at any
time prior to or after the birth, but the father's consent does not become
irrevocable until five days after the birth of the child.
The new statutes require that before a parent executes an act of
surrender, that parent must participate in two counseling sessions with
a trained mental health counselor in order to insure that the parent is
making an informed, voluntary decision. A father is permitted to waive
this requirement. Coupled with the facts that a minor parent can sur-
render to an agency without consent of his or her parents, and that a
parent is not required to be. represented by independent counsel in a
surrender to an agency, this statute when applied in an agency surrender
could be subject to an equal protection attack. A putative father is
allowed to relinquish all claims that he may have to a child without
admitting paternity for the purpose of any other proceeding.
The concern that remains, now that the new statutes have become
effective, is the possibility that the mother could circumvent the father's
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard by declaring in her act
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of surrender that she does not know the identity of the father of the
child. In addition to denying the father his constitutional rights, this
action on the part of the mother could subject the adoptive parents to
extensive litigation with the father. Furthermore, it results in denying
the child potentially critical genetic information, and most importantly,
the opportunity to be raised by a committed biological parent.
Teanna West Neskora
